The Establishment, Power and the gradual Erosion of Democracy in Pakistan.
Engr. Ihsan Ullah Khan
The history of democracy in Pakistan is not characterized by one coup, one dismissal, and one betrayal in politics. It is characterized by a series–a long, continuous procession of events in which an elective power soars aloft, only to be reined, re-modeled or eliminated by any pressure much stronger than that which the governments they permit to live can bear. The personalities on the stage switch but hardly the script. The world that we are now living in is not the result of a single disruption, but a product of decades of disruptions, recalibration, and reworking power.
Since the death of the republic itself, in all the periods when the civilian governments tried to claim real independence, in the selection of foreign policy, in the choice of the path to follow economically, in the fundamental choice of country’s security, the permanent mechanism of the state interfered to restore the normal balance. The successive governments were bound not by the opposition in a parliament but by a non-democratic system which had a veto of the strategic course of the country. Democracy has been allowed to operate in any political cycle just to be allowed to hold on, but never allowed to establish itself.
This tendency was even more visible when the country was swinging between the cautiously organized democratic transitions and the influence of the establishment that was rather subtly and pervasively effective. Political leaders who had gone sour were either exiled, disqualified, jailed or discredited by way of organized campaigns. The qualified ones were promoted, guarded, and advanced. The winds of institutional preference changed judicial decisions, and accountability laws were employed as a political engineering tool, and not a means of justice.
This structure became more elaborate with the rise of hybrid governance, an informal consensus whereby elected governments were taking up the administrative heavy lifting whereas the real instruments of foreign policy, internal security and economic policy were rooted in other places. Leaders in the civil society had come to power with a lot of zeal only to realize that their position was predetermined by the limits of their power. Even in case elections were conducted, how the results were going to turn out was usually influenced by the invisible hands even before the first ballot was casted.
The emergence of the new political players was also orchestrated. Entire movements were made, blown up, and wrapped like solutions to the frustrations of the people. When they were worn out they were disposed of, or were as effectively beaten. People were angry, court cases were decided, the media told stories, and institutions fell into line like a scene of a movie. The change in PPP, PML-N and PTI was not just due to changing of people opinion but rather this was a system that determined who could rule and how many years.
The role of the establishment was more prominent over the years in areas that were initially dominated by the elected authority. Decision-making in economics shifted to military based organizations. Critical policies started going through uniformed dominated forums. The provincial freedom worked under the burdens of centralized security structures. There were still civilian governments, though they had less and less room to manoeuvre with each new “reform”.
It is this historical record, now approaching a new and much more threatening act, the 27th Constitutional Amendment. Contrary to the other interventions that existed in the past which were informal, this amendment aims at constitutionalising the imbalance. The amendment entrenches the primacy of the military in the very framework of the constitution by removing the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and placing all defence power in the office of the Army Chief who is now to be called Chief of Defence Forces. It also forms a caste of officials who cannot be accountable in the normal way because it gives lifetime ranks with immunity similar to that of the President. And by limiting the jurisdiction of the higher court in defence issues, nuclear command, and high appointments, it thwarts any check of the institutions against this broaden power.
All these changes are a turning point. In Pakistan, democracy is being structurally overwritten, no longer interrupted episodically. Parliamentary governance is being structured on the periphery as the real architectural power is being crafted outside of the view. Elections will still take place, cabinets will still be established and parliaments will still sit–but the power of the elected representatives is being well limited with design and purposefulness.
This brings an irony to the common man which is very bitter and cutting. Every political cycle comes with the promise of change, reform and renewal of the state system. Rulers come and go, still the basic power structure is not affected. The general confidence of people in elections is lessened. The debate in politics is empty. Cynicism cripples democratic participation. The audience is made to spectate a repetitive play where hope glimpses before it is killed by some foreseeable powers.
The issue in such a scenery is no longer what political party is in power or who is the leader who has come back home. The actual issue is whether Pakistan is moving on the way of a functional democracy, or it has already crossed the border of a model where democratic forms can live and democratic power cannot get to be.
The history of the world shows that nothing as established as a system can last. The zeal of an agrarian people, the obstinacy of constitutionalists, the general desire of justice, may shake down the most obstinate foundations. The fact that Faiz does not tell us what will happen, but rather asks us to think about what must happen in order to make a country regain its dignity makes his reminder, Hum dekhenge last.
It is upon all of us to watch and keep watching, until that day, until we can insist–against all odds– that Pakistan has not only elections, but democracy. Not only governments, but actual civilian rule. Not a Constitution, but constitutional preeminence.
The story is not over. Its end will not come but it all depends on the people to write a new one.
The author is a researcher, and central spokesperson of Awami National Party (ANP)
